Collective Bargaining, Grievance Adjustment, and the Rival Union by Editors, Law Review
COMMENTS
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, GRIEVANCE ADJUSTMENT,
AND THE RIVAL UNION
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit raises seri-
ous problems in the interpretation of the amended National Labor Relations
Act,x for it suggests not only that major inroads have been made into the scope
of collective bargaining, but also that inter-union rivalry in the employment
relationship may now remain a problem even after certification of a collective
bargaining representative. judge Learned Hand, in Douds v. Local i25o,2 has
interpreted the amended proviso to Section 9(a) of the Act as obliterating the
distinction between "grievances" and "other disputes." This interpretation
creates uncertainty as to the rights under the Act of both the certified represent-
ative and the individual employee. First, it raises the problem of whether, be-
fore the adoption of a collective contract, any subject now lends itself exclusive-
ly to the process of collective bargaining. The court's interpretation, moreover,
suggests that the certified representative, by providing for the settlement of
every kind of dispute in the collective contract, might be able to nullify the
right of individual employees to adjust separately any claim with their em-
ployer. Finally, in permitting a rival union to represent employees in the ad-
justment of a grievance, the decision suggests that the rights of both the cer-
tified representative and the employer have been seriously diminished. To ex-
amine the import which the case may have on future labor relations, it would
be well to state briefly the concepts of collective bargaining and grievance ad-
justment as they have heretofore been known.
The principle of collective bargaining, as expressed in Sections 8(5) and 9(a)
of the Wagner Act, requires that employers shall be under a duty to bargain
exclusively with a properly designated representative of their employees with
respect to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other general condi-
tions of employment."' 3 Once a representative has been elected and certified,
it appears that the employer is under an affirmative duty to bargain collective-
ly with respect to almost any problem which the representative may raise,4
'49 Stat. 449 ('935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1I (Supp. 1947); as amended, 6x Stat. 136 ('947),
29 U.S.C.A. § 15i (Supp. 1949).
2 173 F. 2d 764 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
3 Section 8(d) of the amended Act defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reason-
able times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment." In NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 3o6 U.S. 332, 342 (1939), it was said that
the congressional purpose of the Wagner Act was "to compel employers to bargain collectively
with their employees to the end that employment contracts binding on both parties shall be
made." See x6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 568 (1949), noting Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 17o F. 2d 247
(C.A. 7th, 1948).
4 Subjects concerning which employers have been found under a duty to bargain include
(z) retirement plans: Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 17o F. 2d 247 (C.A. 7th, 1948); (2) merit in-
creases: NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F. 2d 766 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948); (3) Sunday and holiday
provisions: Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (194o), enforced as mod. iig F. 2d i3 (C.C.A.
7th, 1941); (4) health and welfare plans: Glenn L. Martin Co., 16 L.R.R.M. i6r (1945);
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and, at the same time, is under a negative duty to make no contract with his
employees except through that representative.s
Section 9(a) of the original Act contained a proviso which reserved to indi-
vidual employees or groups of employees "the right at any time to present griev-
ances to their employer." The National Labor Relations Board interpreted this
proviso as reserving only the right to lay grievances before the employer and
insisted that adjustments could be made only through negotiation with the bar-
gaining representative.6 The courts, however, did not agree with this interpreta-
tion. In NLRB v. Union Pacific Stages,7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit set aside an order of the Board which had found an employer guilty of
an unfair labor practice in separately settling a grievance over back pay after
the certified union had been called in and was attempting to negotiate an ad-
justment. The same court later held, in NLRB v. North American Aviation,s
that an employer could not be ordered to cease the separate hearing and adjust-
ment of his employees' grievances even though a complete grievance procedure
had been established by the existing collective agreement.9 As a result of these
interpretations, it was seen that practical differences might result from the se-
lection of the appropriate procedure for settling disputes. It therefore became
necessary to draw a meaningful distinction between those demands which had
to be bargained exclusively with the certified representative in accordance with
Section 8(5) and those demands which, as "grievances" within the meaning of
the proviso to Section 9(a), could be settled with the aggiieved employee.
(5) union security: National Licorice Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 537 (1938), enforced as mod. 309 U.S.
350 (1940).
s Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 ('944); NILRB v. Highland Shoe, Inc.,
119 F. 2d 21S8 C.C.A. Ist, 1941); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 113 F. 2d 85 (C.C.A.
5th, 1940).
The employer is also denied the right to take unilateral action affecting general conditions
of employment once certification has been granted. May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB,
326 U.S. 376 (1945); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 3o6 U.S. 332 (I939); General Motors Corp.,
59 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1944), enforced General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, i5o F. 2d 201 (C.C.A.
3 d, x945)-
6 U.S. Automatic Corporation, 57 N.L.R.B. 124 (1944); Hughes Tool Co., 56 N.L.R.B.
981 (1944), enforced as mod. 147 F. 2d 69 (C.C.A. 5th, i945); cf. Arundel Corporation, 59
N.L.R.B. 505 (19 44). This interpretationwas apparentlyconsistentwiththe congressional intent
at the time of the adoption of the Wagner Act. See Hearings before Committee on Labor on
H.R. 6288, 74 th Cong. ist Sess., at 211 (1935) (proviso should "go no further" than to provide
individuals with the right to "present" grievances); Hearings before Committee on Education
and Labor on S. 1958, 74 th Cong. ist Sess., at 321 (i935) (statement that individual grievances
must be turned over to majority representative for adjustment); Weyand, Majority Rule in
Collective Bargaining, 45 Col. L. Rev. 556, 568-9 (i945).
799 F. 2d 153 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
8 136 F. 2d 898 (C.C.A. 9 th, 1943), noted in 44 Col. L. Rev. 97 (1944)-
9 Despite the holding of the North American Aviation case, however, the Board's General
Counsel continued to interpret the proviso as reserving only the right of employees to be pres-
ent at every stage of the grievance procedure while the certified representative was to be per-
mitted to negotiate. 12 L.R.R.M. 2241 k'943).
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This problem was squarely presented to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB."° There the court set aside an order by the
Board that the employer cease and desist from adjusting grievances with any-
one but the certified union, but enforced an order that he notify the union so
that it could be present at the grievance adjustment and thus protect its rights
under the existing agreement. The opinion carefully distinguished between
grievances and matters appropriate to collective bargaining., Where a grievance
involves "only some question of fact or conduct peculiar to the employee, not
affecting the unit," the court said that the employer is not obliged to negotiate
with the representative. Regardless of whether the particular claim is a griev-
ance, however, if it raises "a question of the meaning of the contract, or pre-
sent[s] a situation not covered by the contract touching which an agreement
ought to be made... it is plain that the representative ought to participate, for
bargaining, rather than mere decision on a case according to the contract, is
involved."'-
The Taft-Hartley Act made no changes in the provisions of Section 8(5) of
the Act, but the proviso to Section 9(a), reserving the right of individual em-
ployees or groups of employees to present grievances, was amended by the ad-
dition of the following terms:
.. and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement or contract then in effect; Providedfurther, That the bar-
gaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.3
It will be seen that these words might be read as establishing a grievance
procedure not materially different from that suggested by the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of the old Act.'4 An entirely different interpretation has been
10 147 F. 2d 69 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945), noted in 44 Mich. L. Rev. 320 (I945).
11 "[Clollective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other
conditions of employment which will fix for the future the rules of employment for everyone in
the unit, is distinguished from 'grievances,' which are usually the claims of individuals or
small groups that their rights under the collective bargain have not been respected."
Hughes Tool Co. v. NILRB, 147 F. 2d 69, 72. (C.C.A. 5th, 1945). A similar distinction was
drawn by the Supreme Court in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 713,
723 ('945).
12 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F. 2d 79, 72 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1945).
'3 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § i59(a) (Supp. 1949).
r4 Thus the amended proviso, like the Hughes Tool Co. interpretation, might permit
separate adjustment of personal claims not covered by an existing contract. Unlike that inter-
pretation, however, the proviso might also permit separate adjustment of such claims even
when provided for in an existing agreement so long as the adjustment made is not incon-
sistent with that agreement. But see Individual Employee Grievances under the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, [1949] Wis. L. Rev. 154. Of three possible interpretations of the proviso's
ambiguous language, Professor Cox favors one which would permit separate adjustment but
require that the representative later be called in to express his views and carry the grievance
to any final adjustment provided for in an existing agreement. Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 6z Harv. L. Rev. 274, 303 (1948).
536 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
made in Dos v. Local 125 o,'s however. In that case the NiLRB had certified
an AFL union as exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees in the
unit, and Local 125o had been enjoined from engaging in, or inducing others to
engage in, a strike for the purpose of obtaining recognition as bargaining repre-
sentative for any of the employees. After certification but before the adoption
of a collective contract, Local 1250 picketed the employer's establishment in
protest against his refusal to deal with it regarding the reinstatement of fifty-
one of its members who had been discharged for previous strike activity. 6 This
picketing was found to be in violation of the injunction. In setting aside an or-
der imposing fines for that violation, the court held that Section 8(b) (4) (c), de-
fining unfair union practices,7 must be read consistently with the other provi-
sions of the Act. An injunction issued to prevent the violation of that section
should not, therefore, be held to include the activities of Local 1250 so long as
the question of reinstatement of discharged employees was a "grievance"
which the employer could have adjusted with the Local. The demand for rein-
statement was held to be such a grievance because the amendment to the Sec-
tion 9(a) proviso had eliminated the old distinction between "grievances" and
matters appropriate to collective bargaining. Employees may now separately
settle any dispute, continued the court, so long as its adjustment does not con-
flict with an existing collective agreement. Since no agreement was in effect at
the time of the Local's demand for recognition, it was held that the adjustment
of a dispute over reinstatement could not be inconsistent with any agreement
and could therefore be separately made. 8
In finding that the old distinction between grievances and other disputes had
been eliminated,9 Judge Hand interpreted the amendment to the Section 9(a)
proviso as having given to the bargaining representative a "paramount author-
ZS Note 2 supra.
Z Local 1250, formerly the certified union, had struck in protest against the Board's ruling
that it could not participate in a new election because of the refusal of its officers to file non-
Communist affidavits. The employer offered to take back the discharged employees without
loss of seniority, but not until new vacancies were opened.
17 That section prohibits strikes for the purpose of obtaining recognition as representative
of the employees in a unit while the certification of another is in effect. It was apparently in-
tended to forbid only those strikes "in which one union is certified by the National Labor
Relations Board and another union strikes against the decision of the... Board." Remarks
of Senator Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 3838 (1947). Injunctions to prevent the violation of Section 8(b)
are authorized by Section io(1) of the Act.
is Under the old Act it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
with the representative with respect to reinstatement. NLRB v. Bachelder, 12o F. 2d 574
(C.C.A. 7 th, 1941); Washougal Woolen Mills, 23 N.L.R.B. i (i94o); National Licorice Co.,
7 N.L.R.B. 537 (1938) -
'9 Any necessity for making such a distinction disappeared "as soon as the authority of the
certified agent was made expressly paramount. It then became the natural understanding
that those 'grievances' which could be 'adjusted' comprised all disputes which could be cov-
ered in a collective agreement; and that meant every kind of dispute, for all disputes can be
covered by a collective agreement." 173 F. 2d 764, 769 (C.A. 2d, xQ49).
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ity" which he did not before possess. This paramount authority was said to
stem from the express provision that separate grievance adjustments must not
conflict with an existing collective agreement. It consists, said the court, of the
representative's power either to provide for future disputes in the collective
contract or "to take over the 'adjustment' of any 'grievance,' whether it has
been already 'adjusted,' or is in process of 'adjustment,' and by including it in
a collective agreement with the employer, finally to dispose of it."'2° Such au-
thority is said to eliminate the need for any distinction between "grievances"
and matters appropriate to collective bargaining, for until a collective agree-
ment is made there is nothing with which grievance adjustments can conflict,
and once such an agreement is in effect, any conflict on matters covered by that
agreement is resolved in favor of the agreement. Thus the court interprets the
Act as investing the certified representative with no more than the authority to
contract for all the employees in the unit, for "until he chooses to contract, and
insofar as his contract leaves open any point in dispute, present or future, the
employees retain their common-law right to bargain for themselves, singly or
collectively.""2
It is revealing to compare the legislative history of the amendment of the
Section 9(a) proviso with judge Hand's conclusion that it has invested the bar-
gaining representative with paramount authority which he did not before pos-
sess. The Senate Report indicates that Congress intended not to increase the
rights of the bargaining representative, but rather to give concrete expression
to a limitation upon that right. The words added by the amendment secured
the right of employees separately to adjust grievances with their employer, a
right which was to exist independently of any right possessed by the bargaining
representative. 2 An exception was made to this right, however, where the pro-
posed adjustment would conflict with an existing collective agreement. Accord-
ing to Judge Hand, it is this exception which has invested the representative
with paramount authority, yet it is an exception which, while not expressed,
was read into the Wagner Act even by the courts most anxious to preserve the
20 Ibid. This description of the bargaining representative's powers, while not necessary to
the holding of the case, leaves unanswered a number of questions as to how far Judge Hand
would go in permitting interference with the right of separate grievance adjustment. What
would be the effect of a contractual provision requiring negotiation with the representative
with respect to "all disputes arising out of the employment relationship"? How does one
"adjust" a grievance which has already been "adjusted"? Does the representative's power
extend to settlements already made or does it only permit him to cancel settlements which
set employment conditions for the future? And what of an adjustment made or proposed
which is not inconsistent with the existing contract?
21 i73 F. 2d 764, 769 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
"Senate Report 1o5, 8oth Cong. 1st Sess., at 24 ('947). The Board is criticized for not
having "given full effect" in the past to the proviso and the amendment is said to make it
"clear that the employee's right to present grievances exists independently of the rights of the
bargaining representative." See also House Report 245 on H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess.
(947).
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independent right of separate grievance adjustment.23 Since the distinction be-
tween grievances and other disputes was considered fundamental while the ex-
ception was implicit in the old Act, it is strange indeed to conclude that the
necessity for the distinction has been ended by making the exception express.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that the bargaining representative has so
much authority as Judge Hand seems to think. To say that the representative
can completely bar separate adjustment of personal disputes arising in the fu-
ture would seem to contradict the terms and spirit of the proviso24 Doubts as
to his authority to bar individual adjustments of existing personal claims are
raised by a Supreme Court interpretation of the-Railway Labor Act. s As to his
power to "cancel" individual adjustments, it is true that under the old Act he
could cancel employee contracts concerning future wages, hours, and general
conditions of employment,26 but in the Local z25o case this power probably could
not be exercised by the bargaining representative. Thus if Local 125o had been
able to "adjust" its "grievance" by having the fifty-one members reinstated,
it might be an unfair labor practice for the representative to attempt to "cancel"
that adjustment by having.them discharged for any reason other than their
failure to tender the uniform dues and initiation fee.'7
Even more important is Judge Hand's interpretation of the effect of the Act
on all disputes arising before a collective agreement is made and on all disputes
not provided for in an existing agreement. He asserts that with respect to such
disputes mere certification does not create an obligation on the employer to bar-
gain exclusively with the statutory representative, nor does it end his common-
law right to contract with individual employees. Such an interpretation is a
virtual nullification of the most important provisions of the Act. The statutory
right of exclusive representation is of limited value in respect to any question
already provided for in an existing contract;2 it is of the utmost importance,
however, in obtaining recognition for negotiating that contract or for adjusting
2" It should be remembered that the representative's "paramount authority" as seen by the
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits was derived, not from the implicit require-
ment of consistency with the existing agreement, but rather from the provisions of Sections
8(5) and 9(a).
24 See Olverson, Collective Bargaining and the Taft-Hartley Labor Act, 33 Va. L. Rev. 549,
571 (1947). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had earlier suggested, by way of
dictum, that the rights reserved by the proviso could not be nullified by incorporating every
possible dispute into the collective agreement. NLRB v. North American Aviation, 136 F.
2d 898, 899 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943). In this respect, Judge Hand's interpretation is similar to the
Board's position in U.S. Automatic Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 124 (1944).
2s Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), holding that the bargain-
ing representative did not have the authority to adjust individual grievances.
26 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
27 Section 8(b)(2) of the amended Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause
an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom union membership
has been denied for any reason other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and uniform
initiation fee.
28 The same right would presumably be available to any union which had obtained such a
contract with the employer without the aid of the statute.
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disputes for which provision has not been made.29 Sections 8(5) and 9(a) of the
Act, which impose on employers the duty to bargain exclusively with the certi-
fied representative on matters affecting the basic employment relationship,
cannot be made to depend on the existence or nonexistence of a collective con-
tract if the principle of collective bargaining is to be preserved. In thus limiting
the application of those sections, Judge Hand has threatened the principles
which both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts were designed to promote. The
congressional purpose of encouraging collective bargaining and promoting
stable employment relationships is not achieved by his interpretation.30
The Local 125o case also decided the separate question of whether a rival
union might represent a group of employees in the adjustment of grievances.
While nothing in the original Act expressly prohibited such representation, it
had been held that while an employee "may ask an experienced friend to assist
him," he "cannot present grievances through any union except the [bargaining]
representative."3' That holding had been based partly on the fear that permit-
ting a rival union to negotiate with the employer would result in the kind of
inter-union strife which the Act was designed to prevent. Importance was also
attached to the fact that, in adopting the proviso to Section 9(a), Congress con-
sidered and rejected the addition of the words "through representatives of their
own choosing.""3
judge Hand has held that any necessity for barring grievance adjustments
by rival unions was ended when the proviso to Section 9(a) was amended. By
ending the possibility of conflict between grievance adjustments and the col-
lective agreement, that amendment is said to have ended the threat of possible
conflict between rival unions.33 Grievance negotiations, as the court points out,
'9 "[Tihe important principle is that the union has the power to exclude all changes unless it
is given the opportunity to bargain in respect thereto. Only if the statutory representative is
accorded by law the power to preempt the field as against all individuals or groups... can
collective bargaining be protected." Weyand, op. cit. supra note 6, at 573.
30 Section i of both the original and amended Acts declares it to be the policy of the United
States to encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" and to protect "the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection." See also 34 Corn. L. Rev. 655 (I949),
noting the Local 1250 case, at 658.
3, Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F. 2d 69, 73 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945); cf. Gulf State Utilities
Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 988 (1942).
-The use of this phrase in the Railway Labor Act led the courts to conclude that a rival
union could represent employees in grievance session. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (x945). See also 4o Ops. Att'y Gen. 494 (1946).
33 This argument becomes unconvincing when it is remembered that the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, while barring the rival union, had also made conflict between grievance
adjustments and the collective contract virtually impossible by requiring negotiations with the
representative where the adjustment involved an interpretation of that contract. The same
thing can be said of the court's further argument that the necessity of barring rival unions
disappeared when the representative was given the opportunity to be present at any griev-
ance adjustment, for this right was also implied from the old Act. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB,
147 F. 2d 69 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945).
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require a degree of proficiency and training not possessed by the ordinary em-
ployee. It was therefore held to be inconceivable that Congress, having given
employees the express right to adjust grievances without the intervention of
the bargaining representative, would deny them the best and most experienced
representation in that adjustment.
Exclusive representation in the handling of grievances has long been one of
the most valued rights of unions, for not only is the adjustment of any griev-
ance likely to have some effect on the working unit as a whole,34 but it is also
likely to produce the kind of immediate rewards for the aggrieved employee
which will win his gratitude and future support. It was therefore natural that
even under the limited interpretation of grievance adjustment, a certified union
might strongly object to participation by its greatest rival in such negotiations.
But under the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where
disputes going to the root of the employment relationship have become proper
subject matter for such grievance adjustment, it would seem that the objections
of the certified union would be doubly strong. To permit a rival union to negoti-
ate with respect to wages, hours, and general conditions of employment is to
permit the kind of union rivalry which is so destructive to sound industrial re-
lations. Competition between unions for the support of employees is necessary
to representative unionism, but it has no place at the bargining table.
As for the employer, it might be argued that the Local 125o decision will be a
benefit because of his new opportunity to "play off" one union against another.
But at the same time he will lose a large measure of the protection against
damaging strikes by minority unions which he might have had by virtue of
Section 8(b) (4) (c) of the Act.35 In a like manner, he will also lose the stability
and security which could have been offered by the certified union under the
Hughes Tool Co. decision.36
FREE SPEECH vs. THE FAIR TRIAL IN THE ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN LAW OF CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION
The contrast is striking between the English law of contempt by publication,'
which is both clear and consistently enforced, and the heterogeneous law and
34 Even the adjustment of the most personal grievance is likely to set a precedent for the
established working conditions of the future. See Settling Plant Grievances, Div. of Labor
Standards, Bulletin No. 6o, at 37-38 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1943).
3s See 63 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 362 (1949), noting the Local i250 case.
36 It is well recognized that the employer usually gains, by virtue of collective bargaining,
certain stability of wages, security against work stoppages, and the promise of a constant
supply of trained workers. See Williamson and Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining
25s-17 (1945).
I The term "publication" is used herein in the broadest sense to include not only newspaper
articles but also radio broadcasts, Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 67 A. 2d 497 (1949),
cert. den. 70 S. Ct. 252 (igso), conversation, Robinson v. City Court, i85 P. 2d 256 (1947),
posted notices, Butler v. Butler, 13 P.D. 73 (1888), pamphlets, State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind.
623, 157 N.E. 769, x62 N.E. 441, 163 N.E. 272 (1927), and theatrical exhibits, Rex v.Williams
and Romney, 2 L.J. (O.S.) 3o (K.B., 1823).
